KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs are a group of consumers who purchased or leased a model year 2011–2016 GM Silverado or Sierra 2500 or 3500. Plaintiffs allege that they selected and ultimately purchased or leased their vehicles, at least in part, because of the Duramax diesel engine and systems therein, as advertised and represented by GM. In advertisements for the subject vehicles, GM claimed that the vehicles ran “clean diesel,” had “low emissions,” had “a whopping 63%” reduction of “Nitrogen Oxide (NOx) emissions” when compared to previous models and turned “heavy diesel fuel into a fine mist.” GM omitted any reference to how—or when—its emissions system worked to accomplish these “clean diesel” imperatives. Contrary to GM’s advertisements, however, Plaintiffs allege that the subject vehicles actually emit NOx and other pollutants at levels many times higher than (i) their counterparts, (ii) what a reasonable consumer would expect, (iii) what GM advertised, (iv) the Environmental Protection Agency’s emissions standards, and (v) the levels set for the vehicles to obtain a certificate of compliance that allows them to be sold in the United States. On those bases, Plaintiffs brought this action against General Motors LLC, Robert Bosch GMBH, and Robert Bosch LLC, alleging violations of state consumer protection, fraud, and deceptive trade practices laws, as well as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on all claims. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that (1) Plaintiffs’ state-law claims were preempted by the Clean Air Act, and (2) Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a RICO action. Because Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are not impliedly preempted by the Clean Air Act, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the state-law claims. Because Plaintiffs are indirect-purchasers and thus do not have standing under RICO, however, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the RICO claims.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Kevin Lindke claims that James Freed, the City Manager of Port Huron, Michigan, violated Lindke’s free-speech rights by blocking him on Facebook and deleting his Facebook comments. We originally ruled for Freed on state-action grounds, but the Supreme Court adopted a different test. Because the factual record isn’t developed enough for us to apply the Supreme Court’s revised test, we remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.

Citing a conflict with her religious beliefs, plaintiff Aimee Sturgill objected to defendant American Red Cross’s mandate that she become vaccinated against COVID-19. The Red Cross denied her request for an accommodation, concluding that she was medically—not religiously—opposed to the vaccine and then terminated her employment. Sturgill alleges the Red Cross’s decision reflects a failure to accommodate her religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court dismissed her complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), holding that she did not plausibly allege a prima facie case sufficient to support a failure-to-accommodate claim. Elevating the pleading standard to require a prima facie case was erroneous. However, the district court correctly held that Sturgill did not separately set forth a disparate-treatment claim. We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.