KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While facing charges for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), Defendant David Pennington improperly communicated with witnesses in the case against him. Pennington’s § 1594(c) charge alleged that he participated in a conspiracy to engage in human trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1), 1591(b)(1). The government then charged Pennington with witness tampering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), and dismissed the § 1594(c) conspiracy charge when Pennington pleaded guilty to the witness-tampering charge. When the district court sentenced Pennington, it applied the U.S. Sentencing Guideline that corresponds with his witness-tampering conviction, which prompted a series of cross-references to other guidelines. The final guideline in that chain, U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1, applies to certain human-trafficking offenses and supplies two possible base-offense levels. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2G1.1(a) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). Subsection (a)(1) provides a base-offense level of “34, if the offense of conviction is 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1)”; subsection (a)(2) provides a base-offense level of “14, otherwise.” U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1(a)(1)–(2). Despite the fact that Pennington had not been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1591(b)(1), and no other guideline permitted a court to treat Pennington as if he had been, the district court used subsection (a)(1)’s base-offense level of thirty-four as its starting point. This was an error. Accordingly, we VACATE Pennington’s sentence and REMAND to the district court for resentencing under the properly calculated Guidelines range.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. In this consolidated appeal, which follows a remand for resentencing, two convicted bank robbers challenge the district court’s decision to redo the guidelines calculations and sentencing proceedings entirely, and to apply a new sentencing enhancement that was not considered or applied in their original sentencing. We affirm.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Jeopardy attaches to an “offence,” for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, only when a court or jury has power to determine the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to that “offence.” Here, an Ohio trial court dismissed a manslaughter charge against Travis Soto, pursuant to his agreement to plead guilty to another charge. Ten years later, in connection with the same incident, the State charged Soto with murder. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court and the district court that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar that prosecution

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. On its surface, this appeal concerns an award of attorney fees. It presents, however, issues of ripeness, standing, and mootness that have gone unaddressed through more than five years of litigation. John Doe was an undergraduate student at the University of Michigan (“the University”) who was accused of sexual assault in 2018. Before the University’s investigation had concluded and before any discipline had been issued, he filed a lawsuit alleging that the University’s disciplinary procedures for cases involving sexual assault violated his due-process rights. The district court granted him a preliminary injunction enjoining the disciplinary process from moving forward, and the University appealed, arguing that Doe did not have standing to file his lawsuit and therefore the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2018), in which we held that the University’s disciplinary procedures violated due process, and in light of the University’s new disciplinary policy implemented in response to that decision. The district court granted in part and denied in part the University’s motion to dismiss and granted in part Doe’s motion for partial summary judgment. The University appealed again, renewing its jurisdictional arguments. Before the appeal could be heard, the complainant decided she no longer wished to participate in the disciplinary process. We determined that the appeal had become moot and vacated the district court’s order granting summary judgment. Doe then moved for attorney fees, which the district court granted, and the University appealed once again. We hold that Doe had standing to sue to seek the release of his transcript, but that the district court lacked jurisdiction over his remaining claims. We further hold that Doe was the prevailing party only as to his due-process claim seeking the release of his transcript. We therefore VACATE the district court’s order and REMAND for recalculation of attorney fees.