KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. A three-judge panel convicted Von Clark Davis of aggravated murder and sentenced him to death. On direct appeal, Davis’s sentence was vacated, but on remand, the same three-judge panel again sentenced him to death. We subsequently vacated Davis’s death sentence on appeal of his first federal habeas petition. A different three-judge panel again sentenced Davis to death. Davis again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, and the district court denied the petition. Now on appeal, Davis raises five claims: (1) that the state violated Davis’s constitutional rights by enforcing his 1984 jury waiver against him at his third sentencing hearing in 2009; (2) that Davis’s trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence about the circumstances of Davis’s prior conviction, which provided the aggravating circumstance that made him eligible for the death penalty; (3) that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to move to recuse one of the judges on Davis’s 2009 sentencing panel for bias; (4) that Davis’s trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective in failing to reasonably prepare and present mitigation evidence at Davis’s third sentencing hearing; and (5) that Davis’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing adequately to advise him of the collateral consequences of a jury waiver. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Davis’s constitutional rights were violated when his 1984 jury waiver was enforced against him at his 2009 sentencing hearing and that his trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance at that sentencing hearing, such that we doubt that the hearing produced a fair result. Accordingly, we AFFIRM in part; REVERSE in part; and REMAND to the district court with instructions to CONDITIONALLY GRANT Davis’s petition for writ of habeas corpus as to his first, third, and fourth claims.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. On January 18, 2019, then-sixteen-year-old Nicholas Sandmann and his classmates had an interaction with a Native American man named Nathan Phillips by the Lincoln Memorial in Washington, D.C. Video of the incident went viral, and national news organizations, including the five Defendants (Appellees, or News Organizations) published stories about the day’s events and the ensuing public reaction. Sandmann sued, alleging that the Appellees’ reporting, which included statements from Phillips about the encounter, was defamatory. The district court granted the News Organizations’ joint motion for summary judgment, finding that the challenged statements were opinion, not fact, and therefore nonactionable. Sandmann appealed. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. This case shows that just because a correctional officer may have violated a prison use-of-force policy or committed a state-law tort does not necessarily mean that the officer violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” While serving a short sentence, Joseph Johnson caused a disturbance in a jail’s intake area. Officers chose to take Johnson to his cell, but he then disobeyed orders to slow down. So another officer, Deputy Clair Sootsman, stopped him. After a brief exchange, Johnson stepped in Sootsman’s general direction. Sootsman testified that he viewed this conduct as a threat. In response, he immediately grabbed Johnson’s neck, pushed him against the wall, and took him to the ground to be handcuffed. This force lasted about seven seconds. Investigators found that Sootsman’s actions violated jail policies, and Sootsman pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor battery.

Johnson later sued Sootsman, alleging that his conduct violated the Eighth Amendment. But this constitutional claim requires Johnson to meet a demanding standard. He must prove that Sootsman used force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of” inflicting pain. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citation omitted). Johnson’s claim will fail, by contrast, if Sootsman used force out of a belief—even an unreasonable belief—that the force was necessary to control Johnson. See id. We affirm the district court’s summary-judgment ruling for Sootsman because Johnson lacks enough evidence to meet this demanding Eighth Amendment test. That said, the States may impose stricter limits on officers than the Constitution demands. So our holding does not foreclose all relief for Johnson. It just means that he must try to seek that relief using his state tort claim that the district court dismissed without prejudice.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Two judicial candidates sued the Kentucky Judicial Conduct Commission after they heard the Commission planned to investigate their campaign speech. The district court denied a preliminary injunction, and the candidates appealed. We enjoined the Commission from initiating an investigation during the campaign. But the candidates have since lost their elections. Thus, they no longer face a threat of irreparable harm. We affirm the denial of the preliminary injunction and dissolve the injunction pending appeal.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. An indictment charged motorcycle-gang members Marvin Nicholson and Bryan Sorrell with one count of conspiracy and one count of aiding-and-abetting assault under the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (“VICAR”) statute. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that either of those two offenses could serve as a predicate offense for another count involving the use or carrying of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The jury convicted both Nicholson and Sorrell on those three counts, among others. And we affirmed. Now, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, they appeal the district court’s refusal to vacate their § 924(c) convictions. Because the § 924(c) convictions rested on a valid predicate offense, and because the jury-instruction error on an invalid predicate offense was harmless, we affirm.