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CHRISTOPHER ALAN MITCHELL,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee. |
No. 20-6031 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee at Greeneville.
Nos. 2:09-cr-00017-1; 2:14-cv-00183—J. Ronnie Greer, District Judge.
Argued: April 28, 2022
Decided and Filed: August 5, 2022
Before: McKEAGUE, GRIFFIN, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Almost a decade ago, inmate Christopher Alan
Mitchell moved to vacate his sentence on the ground that he had been erroneously designated as
a career offender under the Armed Career Criminal Act. At first, Mitchell’s efforts bore fruit.
Relying on then-existing law, the district court granted Mitchell’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion,
vacated his sentence, and set the case for resentencing. The resentencing process began but,
before it was completed, developments in other cases revealed that Mitchell was a career
offender after all. So the court vacated the order granting relief, denied Mitchell’s § 2255
motion, and reinstated the original sentence.
Notwithstanding the denial of his § 2255 motion, Mitchell claims that the district court
enjoyed the discretion to resentence him de novo. We disagree. After finding Mitchell ineligible
for § 2255 relief, the court was required to reinstate his original sentence. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We also decline Mitchell’s request to expand his certificate
of appealability. |
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DOMINIQUE CORDELL WALLACE,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee. |
No. 20-5764 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
Nos. 3:15-cr-00098-1; 3:19-cv-01122—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
Argued: June 8, 2022
Decided and Filed: August 5, 2022
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; KETHLEDGE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Dominique Wallace tried to rob a convenience store just
weeks after his release on probation from a three-year detention for attempted murder. This
crime left an accomplice dead and a victim terribly disabled. Wallace pleaded guilty to, among
other things, discharging a firearm during a “crime of violence” that resulted in death, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), and illegally possessing a firearm as a felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In this collateral challenge, Wallace asserts that we should vacate these
convictions because of a pair of decisions that the Supreme Court issued after he pleaded guilty.
Wallace is right with respect to his crime-of-violence conviction under § 924(j). In
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019), the Court found part of § 924’s definition of
“crime of violence” to be unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 2336. Given Davis, Wallace did not
violate § 924(j) because his attempted robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under
the constitutional part of § 924’s definition. Despite his specific crime’s violent nature, his
offense falls outside § 924 under the “categorical approach” to answering this crime-of-violence
question.
But Wallace is wrong with respect to his felon-in-possession conviction under
§ 922(g)(1). In Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), the Court held that defendants
do not violate § 922(g)(1) unless they know that they have been convicted of a crime punishable
by more than one year in prison when they possess firearms. Id. at 2196. Citing Rehaif, Wallace
argues that the district court erred by not informing him during his plea hearings that the
government must prove that he knew his prior offense (attempted murder) was punishable by
more than a year in prison. Yet Wallace procedurally defaulted this claim because he did not
raise it in his criminal proceedings, and he has offered no valid reason for us to excuse this
default. We thus affirm in part and reverse in part the district court’s denial of Wallace’s motion
to vacate his convictions. |
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