CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Under Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code, when is a bank entitled to a remedy (here, restitution) from a payee for mistakenly paying a negotiable instrument (here, a check)? And when does a payee take a check in “good faith” and “for value,” enabling the payee to defend against a payor bank’s claim for restitution? Those questions are posed here, as they were before the district court. At summary judgment, the district court held that two checks cashed at Commercial Bank and Trust were paid to Doug Goodman by “mistake” within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-418(b), and that Goodman could not demonstrate that he took the checks in good faith and for value, see id. § 47- 3-418(c), entitling the Bank to restitution. We agree and thus affirm.

Plaintiffs are adherents to Christian Identity, a religion that is “explicitly racist.” Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 2020). In its view, Caucasians are “God’s chosen people.” Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). After the Michigan Department of Corrections refused to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of the Michigan prison system, plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA), requesting that the Department be directed to recognize Christian Identity as a religion. The district court affirmed the Department’s denial, and plaintiffs appealed.

In Fox, we held that plaintiffs satisfied the first two parts of the three-part RLUIPA test, but we remanded to the district court for the Department to sustain its “heavy burden” under a strict scrutiny analysis to show that its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and, if so, that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest. 949 F.3d at 283.

On remand, the district court concluded that the Department met its burden and that refusing to recognize Christian Identity was the least restrictive means to ensure its compelling governmental interest. We disagree and hold that the Department failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Alternatives, other than to simply accept or reject recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but never considered by it.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment in plaintiffs’ favor.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Early on a February morning in Lansing, Michigan, an officer noticed a man, later determined to be Jaron Morgan, seemingly passed out at the wheel of a stopped, still running, car. Without knocking on the car door, shining a flashlight into the car, or otherwise trying to arouse Morgan, the officer opened the car door and asked Morgan whether everything was okay. Morgan was groggy, and the officer asked for his identification. An altercation ensued. The officer arrested Morgan and found a firearm in the car and drugs on him, prompting a criminal indictment. The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment based on the community-caretaking doctrine, Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty, and the court sentenced him to 204 months. We reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.