JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After police arrested Harold Smith with a loaded gun in his possession, he was charged with illegally possessing a firearm and ammunition as a felon. Leading up to trial, he had the opportunity to stipulate his status as a felon and his knowledge of the same to preclude the government from introducing evidence of any of his prior felony convictions. But he declined. So the government introduced evidence of Smith’s eleven prior felony convictions at trial, and a jury convicted him on both charges. As Smith had three prior violent felony convictions, the district court sentenced him as an armed career criminal.

Smith raises two issues on appeal. First, he asks that we vacate his conviction and sentence based on the alleged unfairly prejudicial taint of evidence of his eleven prior felony convictions. We decline and affirm the district court on this issue. Smith then asks that we vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing because his North Carolina conviction for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury should not qualify as a predicate violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Because the offense requires purposeful or knowing conduct, it is categorically a violent felony, so we affirm.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Roy West was convicted for his participation in a murder-for-hire conspiracy and sentenced to life in prison. After his direct appeals and 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion failed, West sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582. In that motion, he argued for the first time that his sentence violated Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). He claimed that the jury instructions given at his trial did not sufficiently require the jury to find that death resulted from the conspiracy—a necessary finding for the court to impose a life sentence for the crime. The district court found that the Apprendi error and West’s rehabilitation constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce his sentence and granted West compassionate release after seventeen years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

On appeal, the government argues that the judgment of the district court should be reversed because it improperly used compassionate release as a vehicle for second or successive § 2255 motions. We agree and reverse.