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IN RE: AUTOMOTIVE PARTS ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
End-Payor Actions.
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END-PAYOR PLAINTIFFS,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
FINANCIAL RECOVERY SERVICES, LLC,
Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
   No. 20-2260
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:12-md-02311—Sean F. Cox, District Judge.
Argued: April 27, 2022
Decided and Filed: May 12, 2022
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; MOORE and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. More than a year and a half after final approval of third-round settlements in a billion-dollar multidistrict litigation, Financial Recovery Services, LLC (FRS), a company that manages and files claims on behalf of its insurer clients, moved to intervene. The district court denied FRS’s motion, finding FRS’s intervention untimely. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.



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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DANIEL FRANK MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
   No. 21-5598
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Jackson.
No. 1:19-cr-10133-1—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge.
Argued: March 17, 2022
Decided and Filed: May 12, 2022
Before: MOORE, COLE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
_________________________

COLE, Circuit Judge. Daniel Miller pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, the government objected to United States Probation and Pretrial Services’ recommended offense level, arguing Miller’s prior convictions for Tennessee drug delivery were “controlled substance offenses” under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. But the district court rejected the government’s argument, reasoning our decision in United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (en banc), reconsideration denied 929 F.3d 317 (Mem.), controlled. Sitting en banc, we accepted the Havis parties’ agreement that “the least culpable conduct” proscribed by Tennessee’s drug delivery statute was “the attempted delivery of a controlled substance” and unanimously held that attempt crimes were not “controlled substance offenses” because they were omitted from the Guidelines’ text. Id. at 385, 387. Since then, however, we have repeatedly acknowledged that “the parties’ assumption in Havis was wrong.” United States v. Booker, 994 F.3d 591, 596 (6th Cir. 2021) (collecting cases). In this case, we clarify that the parties in Havis were mistaken about the scope of Tennessee’s drug delivery statute. Because our legal determinations cannot be dictated by parties’ stipulations, we evaluate the statute anew and conclude it is a controlled substance offense. Accordingly, we vacate Miller’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.



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DILLON BURNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
JOSH GRIFFITH,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
   Nos. 21-1242/1293
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:19-cv-00257—Hala Y. Jarbou, District Judge.
Argued: March 8, 2022
Decided and Filed: May 12, 2022
Before: GILMAN, STRANCH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.


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OPINION
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RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Dillon Burnett brought an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state-law claim for assault and battery, against Sergeant Josh Griffith, a Van Buren County corrections officer. The claim is based on Sergeant Griffith’s alleged use of excessive force while Burnett was in custody at the Van Buren County Jail.

The district court granted Sergeant Griffith’s motion for summary judgment. It concluded that, although the evidence could allow a reasonable jury to find that Sergeant Griffith had used excessive force in bringing Burnett under control, the sergeant was nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because he did not have fair warning that his actions were unconstitutional. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.