Petitioner Mario Banuelos-Jimenez petitions for review of the Immigration Judge’s and Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA’s) decisions denying cancellation of removal. The immigration judge concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that his state conviction for third-degree assault on a family member was a crime of violence and, therefore, he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. We agree and deny the petition for review.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Nashville”) passed a “sidewalk ordinance” that imposes sidewalk-related conditions on landowners who seek building permits. To obtain a permit, owners must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere. This ordinance implicates a question about the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause that has divided state courts. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).

In particular, the parties here disagree over the “test” that we should use to judge whether the sidewalk ordinance commits a taking. The landowner plaintiffs ask us to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted to assess conditions on building permits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nashville responds that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville says, we should turn to the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

We side with the landowner plaintiffs. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test thus should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. Because the district court reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse its grant of summary judgment to Nashville and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.