CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff StarLink Logistics, Inc. (“StarLink”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of some of its claims for lack of jurisdiction and the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendant ACC, LLC (“ACC”) as to its remaining claims. In January 2012, StarLink sued ACC for civil penalties, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief under the citizen suit provisions of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972, alleging that ACC’s improperly closed landfill was polluting StarLink’s land. After StarLink initiated its suit, ACC and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (“Department”) finalized a consent order requiring ACC to abate the landfill’s pollution. The overarching issue on appeal is what effect this consent order and ACC’s subsequent compliance efforts have on StarLink’s citizen suit.

In light of the consent order, the district court disposed of StarLink’s claims. With respect to ACC’s alleged violations of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act occurring prior to the consent order, the district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as moot and granted summary judgment to ACC as to StarLink’s claims for civil penalties. In the alternative to its mootness and civil penalties rulings, the district court concluded that it would have granted summary judgment to ACC as to all violations occurring prior to the consent order on the basis of claim preclusion. With respect to violations occurring after the consent order, the district court dismissed StarLink’s claims for failure to meet the Clean Water Act’s and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act’s jurisdictional notice requirements.

For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. At the time of Calvin Caver’s sentencing, the federal drug laws subjected Caver to a mandatory term of life imprisonment because he conspired to distribute more than 50 grams of “crack” cocaine and had committed three prior “felony drug offenses.” Later, however, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 increased the amount of crack cocaine required to trigger this life sentence to 280 grams. The First Step Act of 2018 then allowed defendants like Caver to seek retroactive relief “as if” they had committed their crimes after the Fair Sentencing Act. Caver sought a reduced sentence under the First Step Act. But the district court held that this Act gave it no discretion to grant him relief. It reasoned that Caver’s jury had found that his drug crime involved at least 500 grams of crack cocaine—an amount that still exceeded the 280 grams required to trigger a mandatory life sentence after the Fair Sentencing Act. We agree and affirm.