JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. The district court revoked Eric Sears’s supervised release for a second time and sentenced him to a consecutive term of eighteen months of imprisonment. Sears appeals his sentence, arguing that it was procedurally unreasonable because the district court miscalculated his supervised release Guidelines range by exceeding the maximum length permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). He also contends that the new term of supervised release is substantively unreasonable because of its consecutive nature. We hold that under § 3583(e)(3), prior time served for violations of supervised release is not credited toward and does not limit the statutory maximum that a court may impose for subsequent violations of supervised release. Furthermore, the district court articulated its balancing of the relevant sentencing factors and imposed a sentence at the low-end of Sears’s Guidelines range. Sears’s sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable, and accordingly we affirm.

The court received a petition for rehearing en banc. The original panel has reviewed the petition for rehearing and concludes that the issues raised in the petition were fully considered upon the original submission and decision of the case. The petition then was circulated to the full court. No judge has requested a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

Therefore, the petition is denied.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Midland Brewing Company hired Ryan Boshaw to work as a server. Midland soon promoted Boshaw, three times in all, ultimately to the second-highest ranking position in its restaurant. But before long, trouble was brewing for Boshaw. Following a series of missteps, he was fired roughly one year after joining Midland. Boshaw sued Midland, its owner, and his supervisor, alleging that they discriminated and retaliated against him, primarily due to his sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA). The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. We affirm.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Suppose a prosecutor told a district court that “a sentence at the top of a defendant’s guidelines range was at least appropriate under the relevant sentencing factors, if not required by them.” The court would likely understand the prosecutor to be arguing that such a sentence was legally permissible and perhaps even legally compelled. Now suppose that the prosecutor told the court that “a sentence at least at the top of the defendant’s guidelines range was appropriate.” The court would likely take the prosecutor to be arguing that such a sentence was the minimally acceptable one and that an above-guidelines sentence might also be justified.

This case requires us to consider which of these two ideas the prosecutor conveyed during Manuel Estrada-Gonzalez’s sentencing for illegally reentering the country. Estrada-Gonzalez claims that the prosecutor impliedly recommended an above-guidelines sentence by stating that a sentence at the “high end of the sentencing guideline range would be at the least appropriate in this case.” Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 140. He thus argues that the prosecutor breached the parties’ plea agreement, which barred her from “suggest[ing] in any way” that the court should vary above the guidelines range. Agreement, R.16, PageID 67. Yet the district court that heard this ambiguous statement in real time rejected Estrada-Gonzalez’s reading of it, finding instead that the prosecutor had been advocating only “for a sentence at the high range of the guidelines.” Sent. Tr., R.29, PageID 146. And while our precedent instructs us to review the ultimate question whether a prosecutor’s conduct breached a plea agreement de novo, see United States v. Warren, 8 F.4th 444, 448 (6th Cir. 2021), we clarify in this case that we must review any subsidiary findings about the historical facts under the deferential clear-error standard. What the prosecutor expressed with her statement is that type of fact question. Because the district court did not clearly err in its resolution of the question, the government did not breach the plea agreement. We thus affirm.

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge. Before us is a petition from the United States for a writ of mandamus directed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The petition poses questions about a district court’s authority to comment on pending plea-bargain agreements and to reject an agreement once it is finalized.

At a pretrial hearing, the district court informed the United States and the Defendant that it had a longstanding “practice” of rejecting plea agreements with certain plea-bargaining terms. The parties thereafter negotiated a plea agreement in private and decided to include the very terms that the court had stated that it disfavored. The court rejected the agreement, and the United States filed this petition, claiming that the court violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and abused its discretion. We AGREE and GRANT the petition.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Andrew Meek appeals his 87-month sentence for two child pornography offenses. He says that the district court erred by withholding a two-level reduction in his offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(1), and by imposing a $5,000 special assessment for each count of conviction. We disagree and affirm Meek’s sentence.