SUTTON, Chief Judge. After being indicted for violating one or more criminal laws, a defendant may plead guilty to some of the charges for all manner of reasons, including a commitment by the government to drop other charges or to recommend a shorter sentence. Criminal Rule 11 establishes a highly reticulated process to ensure that each defendant enters any such agreement knowingly and voluntarily. The courts do not lightly undo such bargains. Absent a mistake in the Rule 11 process or a preserved constitutional violation with respect to the plea-bargaining process, a post-conviction claimant has few options for relief other than executive-branch clemency. One narrow exception is that he may raise a claim of “actual innocence” to an offense covered by the guilty plea, say because subsequent caselaw establishes that the charge no longer amounts to a criminal offense. To obtain relief under this exception, however, the claimant must demonstrate his “actual innocence” of any “more serious” charges that the government dismissed as part of the plea deal. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 624 (1998).

Today’s consolidated cases raise a variation on this issue. When plea bargainers wish to raise procedurally defaulted postconviction challenges to their offenses of conviction, but cannot show their actual innocence of “equally serious” dismissed counts, may we excuse the default? The answer is no.