HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Benny Lee Hodge, a Kentucky death-row inmate, appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Hodge’s petition primarily concerns the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel at the sentencing phase. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court applied a standard of prejudice that is contrary to established Supreme Court precedent, counsel’s failure to present mitigation evidence was constitutionally deficient, and there is a reasonable probability that counsel’s failure affected the outcome of Hodge’s sentencing, we reverse the district court and remand with instructions to grant conditional habeas relief as to the penalty phase of Hodge’s trial. Hodge also raises jury-tampering and jury-bias claims, which we conclude are without merit.

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Because the Kentucky Supreme Court applied an incorrect legal standard of prejudice that is contrary to Supreme Court precedent and Hodge’s unheard mitigation testimony considered with the totality of the evidence creates “a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance,” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of habeas relief on Hodge’s IAC claim and REMAND with instructions to grant conditional habeas relief as to the penalty phase.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Zachariah Histed pleaded guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, and the district court sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment. Histed appeals his sentence on procedural and substantive grounds, arguing that the district court improperly calculated the drug quantity, erroneously applied multiple sentencing enhancements, wrongfully denied him credit for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a sentence that was too long. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, vacate Histed’s sentence, and remand for resentencing.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. In life, sometimes it’s better to show up late than not at all. But in law, tardiness can be costly. Here, the parties’ counsel received several extensions of this court’s briefing deadlines. In the meantime, the clock struck midnight on the underlying issue. As a result, this appeal is now moot.