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INNER CITY CONTRACTING, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF NORTHVILLE, MICHIGAN;
FLEIS & VANDENBRINK ENGINEERING, INC. dba Fleis
& Vandenbrink,
Defendants-Appellees. |
No. 22-2131 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 2:22-cv-11349—Sean F. Cox, District Judge.
Argued: October 18, 2023
Decided and Filed: November 30, 2023
Before: CLAY, KETHLEDGE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff, a government contractor, brought suit against Defendants,
a township and a consulting company, claiming racial discrimination after the consulting company
allegedly made false and inaccurate statements about Plaintiff, leading Defendant township to
award a government contract to a rival firm. The suit alleged violations of Plaintiff’s rights under
the Constitution, federal statutes, and Michigan law. The district court dismissed the case on the
grounds that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under either 42 U.S.C. § 1981 or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
failing to allege the racial composition of its ownership. Further, the district court held that
Plaintiff lacked standing to assert its constitutional claims, and that Defendant consulting company
was not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE in
part and AFFIRM in part the district court’s order dismissing the case and REMAND the case
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. |
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STATE OF OHIO; STATE OF ALABAMA; STATE OF
ARKANSAS; STATE OF FLORIDA; STATE OF KANSAS;
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; STATE OF MISSOURI;
STATE OF NEBRASKA; STATE OF OKLAHOMA; STATE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
XAVIER BECERRA, Secretary, Department of Health
and Human Services and JESSICA S. MARCELLA,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs, in
their official capacities; DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; OFFICE OF POPULATION AFFAIRS,
Defendants-Appellees. |
No. 21-4235 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:21-cv-00675—Timothy S. Black, District Judge.
Argued: October 27, 2022
Decided and Filed: November 30, 2023
Before: MOORE, THAPAR, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. In 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
issued a final rule governing the Title X grant program, which makes grants to assist in the
establishment and operation of family planning projects. Among other things, the Rule
interpreted § 1008 of Title X, which bars funds appropriated under the Title X grant program
from being “used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning.” A group of states
sued, seeking to block two provisions of the 2021 Rule. First, the States challenge the 2021
Rule’s elimination of a prior HHS rule that required grantees to maintain strict physical and
financial separation between their Title X programs and any abortion-related services they might
provide. Second, they challenge the Rule’s requirement that Title X projects provide referrals
for abortion services when requested by the patient.
The Supreme Court has already had occasion to interpret § 1008, the statutory provision
at the heart of this case. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court held that § 1008 is ambiguous as
to program integrity and referrals for abortion and that Chevron deference applies. 500 U.S. 173,
184 (1991). Therefore, we defer to the agency’s interpretation of § 1008 if the interpretation is
permissible. Id. While the doctrinal landscape undergirding Rust has shifted significantly since
it was decided, Rust, and its application of Chevron, remain binding on this court. Applying
Rust, we cannot say that the 2021 Rule’s referral requirement is an impermissible interpretation
of § 1008. However, we hold that the 2021 Rule’s program-integrity requirements do not
represent a permissible interpretation of § 1008. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s
denial of a preliminary injunction in part and REVERSE in part. |
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