The Lanham Act, the core federal trademark statute, defines a trademark by its primary function: identifying a product’s source and distinguishing that source from others. In serving that function, trademarks help consumers select the products they want to purchase (or avoid) and help producers reap the financial rewards associated with a product’s good reputation. To help protect trademarks, the Lanham Act creates federal causes of action for trademark infringement and trademark dilution. In a typical infringement case, the question is whether the defendant’s use of a mark is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15 U. S. C. §§1114(1)(A), 1125(a)(1)(A). In a typical dilution case, the question is whether the defendant “harm[ed] the reputation” of a famous trademark. §§1125(c)(2)(A), (C).

  Respondent VIP Products makes a squeaky, chewable dog toy designed to look like a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey. But not entirely. On the toy, for example, the words “Jack Daniel’s” become “Bad Spaniels.” And “Old No. 7 Brand Tennessee Sour Mash Whiskey” turns into “The Old No. 2 On Your Tennessee Carpet.” These jokes did not impress petitioner Jack Daniel’s Properties, which owns trademarks in the distinctive Jack Daniel’s bottle and in many of the words and graphics on its label.

  Soon after the Bad Spaniels toy hit the market, Jack Daniel’s demanded that VIP stop selling it. VIP filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that Bad Spaniels neither infringed nor diluted Jack Daniel’s trademarks. Jack Daniel’s counterclaimed for infringement and dilution. At summary judgment, VIP argued that Jack Daniel’s infringement claim failed under the so-called Rogers test—a threshold test developed by the Second Circuit and designed to protect First Amendment interests in the trademark context. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F. 2d 994. When “expressive works” are involved, VIP contended, that test requires dismissal of an infringement claim at the outset unless the complainant can show either (1) that the challenged use of a mark “has no artistic relevance to the underlying work” or (2) that it “explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Id., at 999. Because Jack Daniel’s could not make that showing, VIP claimed, the Lanham Act’s statutory “likelihood of confusion” standard became irrelevant. And as for the dilution claim, VIP urged that Jack Daniel’s could not succeed because Bad Spaniels was a parody of Jack Daniel’s and therefore made “fair use” of its famous marks. §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii).

  The District Court rejected both of VIP’s contentions for a common reason: because VIP had used the cribbed Jack Daniel’s features as trademarks—i.e., to identify the source of its own products. As the District Court saw it, when another’s trademark is used for “source identification,” Rogers does not apply, and instead the infringement suit turns on likelihood of confusion. The court likewise rejected VIP’s invocation of the fair-use exclusion, holding that parodies fall within that exclusion only when they do not use a famous mark to identify the source of the alleged diluter’s product. The case proceeded to a bench trial, where the District Court found that consumers were likely to be confused about the source of the Bad Spaniels toy and that the toy’s negative associations with dog excrement (e.g., “The Old No. 2”) would harm Jack Daniel’s reputation. The Ninth Circuit reversed. Finding the infringement claim subject to the threshold Rogers test, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to decide whether Jack Daniel’s could satisfy either prong of that test. And the Court of Appeals awarded judgment on the dilution claim to VIP, holding that because Bad Spaniels parodies Jack Daniel’s, it falls under the “noncommercial use” exclusion. §1125(c)(3)(C). On remand, the District Court found that Jack Daniel’s could not satisfy either prong of Rogers, and so granted summary judgment to VIP on infringement. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed.

Held:

 1. When an alleged infringer uses a trademark as a designation of source for the infringer’s own goods, the Rogers test does not apply. Pp. 10–19.

   (a) The Second Circuit created the Rogers test for titles of “artistic works” based on its view that such titles have an “expressive element” implicating “First Amendment values” and carry only a “slight risk” of confusing consumers about the “source or content” of the underlying work. 875 F. 2d, at 998–1000. Over the decades, lower courts adopting Rogers have confined it to similar cases, in which a trademark is used not to designate a work’s source, but solely to perform some other expressive function. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F. 3d 894, 901 (use of the Barbie name in band’s song “Barbie Girl” was “not [as] a source identifier”). The same courts, though, routinely conduct likelihood-of-confusion analysis in cases where trademarks are used as trademarks—i.e., to designate source. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414–415 (parodic pet perfumes did not trigger Rogers because defendant’s use of Tommy Hilfiger’s mark was “at least in part” for “source identification”). Thus, whatever Rogers’ merit—an issue on which this Court takes no position—it has always been a cabined doctrine: It has not insulated from ordinary trademark scrutiny the use of trademarks as trademarks.

 That conclusion fits trademark law, and reflects its primary mission. Consumer confusion about source—trademark law’s cardinal sin—is most likely to arise when someone uses another’s trademark as a trademark. In such cases, Rogers has no proper application. Nor does that result change because the use of a mark has other expressive content. Under the Ninth Circuit’s approach, Bad Spaniels was automatically entitled to Rogers’ protection because it “communicate[d] a humorous message.” 953 F. 3d 1170, 1175. On that view, few trademark cases would ever get to the likelihood-of-confusion analysis. And the Ninth Circuit was mistaken to believe that the First Amendment demanded such a result. When a mark is used as a source identifier, the First Amendment does not demand a threshold inquiry. Pp. 10–17.

  (b) In this case, VIP conceded that it used the Bad Spaniels trademark and trade dress as source identifiers. And VIP has said and done more in the same direction with respect to Bad Spaniels and other similar products. The only question remaining is whether the Bad Spaniels trademarks are likely to cause confusion. Although VIP’s effort to parody Jack Daniel’s does not justify use of the Rogers test, it may make a difference in the standard trademark analysis. This Court remands that issue to the courts below. Pp. 17–19.

 2. The Lanham Act’s exclusion from dilution liability for “[a]ny noncommerical use of a mark,” §1125(c)(3)(C), does not shield parody, criticism, or commentary when an alleged diluter uses a mark as a designation of source for its own goods. The Ninth Circuit’s holding to the contrary puts the noncommercial exclusion in conflict with the statute’s fair-use exclusion. The latter exclusion specifically covers uses “parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon” a famous mark owner, §1125(c)(3)(A)(ii), but does not apply when the use is “as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or services,” §1125(c)(3)(A). Given that carve-out, parody is exempt from liability only if not used to designate source. The Ninth Circuit’s expansive view of the noncommercial use exclusion—that parody is always exempt, regardless whether it designates source—effectively nullifies Congress’s express limit on the fair-use exclusion for parody. Pp. 19–20.

953 F. 3d 1170, vacated and remanded.

 Kagan, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas and Barrett, JJ., joined.

The issue presented is whether the districting plan adopted by the State of Alabama for its 2022 congressional elections likely violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act, 52 U. S. C. §10301. As originally enacted in 1965, §2 of the Act tracked the language of the Fifteenth Amendment, providing that “[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, this Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment—and thus §2—prohibits States from acting with a “racially discriminatory motivation” or an “invidious purpose” to discriminate, but it does not prohibit laws that are discriminatory only in effect. Id., at 61–65 (plurality opinion). Criticism followed, with many viewing Mobile’s intent test as not sufficiently protective of voting rights. But others believed that adoption of an effects test would inevitably require a focus on proportionality, calling voting laws into question whenever a minority group won fewer seats in the legislature than its share of the population. Congress ultimately resolved this debate in 1982, reaching a bipartisan compromise that amended §2 to incorporate both an effects test and a robust disclaimer that “nothing” in §2 “establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.” §10301(b).

 In 1992, §2 litigation challenging the State of Alabama’s then-existing districting map resulted in the State’s first majority-black district and, subsequently, the State’s first black Representative since 1877. Alabama’s congressional map has remained remarkably similar since that litigation. Following the 2020 decennial census, a group of plaintiffs led by Alabama legislator Bobby Singleton sued the State, arguing that the State’s population growth rendered the existing congressional map malapportioned and racially gerrymandered in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. While litigation was proceeding, the Alabama Legislature’s Committee on Reapportionment drew a new districting map that would reflect the distribution of the prior decade’s population growth across the State. The resulting map largely resembled the 2011 map on which it was based and similarly produced only one district in which black voters constituted a majority. That new map was signed into law as HB1.

  Three groups of Alabama citizens brought suit seeking to stop Alabama’s Secretary of State from conducting congressional elections under HB1. One group (Caster plaintiffs) challenged HB1 as invalid under §2. Another group (Milligan plaintiffs) brought claims under §2 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And a third group (the Singleton plaintiffs) amended the complaint in their ongoing litigation to challenge HB1 as a racial gerrymander under the Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge District Court was convened, and the Singleton and Milligan actions were consolidated before that District Court for purposes of preliminary injunction proceedings, while Caster proceeded before one of the judges on a parallel track. After an extensive hearing, the District Court concluded in a 227-page opinion that the question whether HB1 likely violated §2 was not “close.” The Court preliminarily enjoined Alabama from using HB1 in forthcoming elections. The same relief was ordered in Caster.

Held: The Court affirms the District Court’s determination that plaintiffs demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on their claim that HB1 violates §2. Pp. 9–22, 25–34.

 (a) The District Court faithfully applied this Court’s precedents in concluding that HB1 likely violates §2. Pp. 9–15.

  (1) This Court first addressed the 1982 amendments to §2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, and has for the last 37 years evaluated §2 claims using the Gingles framework. Gingles described the “essence of a §2 claim” as when “a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters.” Id., at 47. That occurs where an “electoral structure operates to minimize or cancel out” minority voters’ “ability to elect their preferred candidates.” Id., at 48. Such a risk is greatest “where minority and majority voters consistently prefer different candidates” and where minority voters are submerged in a majority voting population that “regularly defeat[s]” their choices. Ibid.

 To prove a §2 violation under Gingles, plaintiffs must satisfy three “preconditions.” Id., at 50. First, the “minority group must be sufficiently large and [geographically] compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district.” Wisconsin Legislature v. Wisconsin Elections Comm’n, 595 U. S. ___, ___ (per curiam). “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Gingles, 478 U. S., at 51. And third, “the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Ibid. A plaintiff who demonstrates the three preconditions must then show, under the “totality of circumstances,” that the challenged political process is not “equally open” to minority voters. Id., at 45–46. The totality of circumstances inquiry recognizes that application of the Gingles factors is fact dependent and requires courts to conduct “an intensely local appraisal” of the electoral mechanism at issue, as well as a “searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality.” Id., at 79. Congress has not disturbed the Court’s understanding of §2 as Gingles construed it nearly 40 years ago. Pp. 9–11.

  (2) The extensive record in these cases supports the District Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs’ §2 claim was likely to succeed under Gingles. As to the first Gingles precondition, the District Court correctly found that black voters could constitute a majority in a second district that was “reasonably configured.” The plaintiffs adduced eleven illustrative districting maps that Alabama could enact, at least one of which contained two majority-black districts that comported with traditional districting criteria. With respect to the compactness criteria, for example, the District Court explained that the maps submitted by one expert “perform[ed] generally better on average than” did HB1, and contained no “bizarre shapes, or any other obvious irregularities.” Plaintiffs’ maps contained equal populations, were contiguous, and respected existing political subdivisions. Indeed, some of plaintiffs’ proposed maps split the same (or even fewer) county lines than the State’s.

 The Court finds unpersuasive the State’s argument that plaintiffs’ maps were not reasonably configured because they failed to keep together the Gulf Coast region. Even if that region is a traditional community of interest, the District Court found the evidence insufficient to sustain Alabama’s argument that no legitimate reason could exist to split it. Moreover, the District Court found that plaintiffs’ maps were reasonably configured because they joined together a different community of interest called the Black Belt—a community with a high proportion of similarly situated black voters who share a lineal connection to “the many enslaved people brought there to work in the antebellum period.”

 As to the second and third Gingles preconditions, the District Court determined that there was “no serious dispute that Black voters are politically cohesive, nor that the challenged districts’ white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to usually defeat Black voters’ preferred candidate.” The court noted that, “on average, Black voters supported their candidates of choice with 92.3% of the vote” while “white voters supported Black-preferred candidates with 15.4% of the vote.” Even Alabama’s expert conceded “that the candidates preferred by white voters in the areas that he looked at regularly defeat the candidates preferred by Black voters.” Finally, the District Court concluded that plaintiffs had carried their burden at the totality of circumstances stage given the racial polarization of elections in Alabama, where “Black Alabamians enjoy virtually zero success in statewide elections” and where “Alabama’s extensive history of repugnant racial and voting-related discrimination is undeniable and well documented.” The Court sees no reason to disturb the District Court’s careful factual findings, which are subject to clear error review and have gone unchallenged by Alabama in any event. Pp. 11–15.

 (b) The Court declines to remake its §2 jurisprudence in line with Alabama’s “race-neutral benchmark” theory.

  (1) The Court rejects the State’s contention that adopting the race-neutral benchmark as the point of comparison in §2 cases would best match the text of the VRA. Section 2 requires political processes in a State to be “equally open” such that minority voters do not “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” §10301(b). Under the Court’s precedents, a district is not equally open when minority voters face—unlike their majority peers—bloc voting along racial lines, arising against the backdrop of substantial racial discrimination within the State, that renders a minority vote unequal to a vote by a nonminority voter. Alabama would ignore this precedent in favor of a rationale that a State’s map cannot “abridge[ ]” a person’s right to vote “on account of race” if the map resembles a sufficient number of race-neutral alternatives. But this Court’s cases have consistently focused, for purposes of litigation, on the specific illustrative maps that a plaintiff adduces. Deviation from that map shows it is possible that the State’s map has a disparate effect on account of race. The remainder of the Gingles test helps determine whether that possibility is reality by looking to polarized voting preferences and the frequency of racially discriminatory actions taken by the State.

 The Court declines to adopt Alabama’s interpretation of §2, which would “revise and reformulate the Gingles threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of [the Court’s] §2 jurisprudence” for decades. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U. S. 1, 16 (plurality opinion). Pp. 15–18.

  (2) Alabama argues that absent a benchmark, the Gingles framework ends up requiring the racial proportionality in districting that §2(b) forbids. The Court’s decisions implementing §2 demonstrate, however, that when properly applied, the Gingles framework itself imposes meaningful constraints on proportionality. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 633–634; Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 906; Bush v. Vera, 517 U. S. 952, 957 (plurality opinion). In Shaw v. Reno, for example, the Court considered the permissibility of a second majority-minority district in North Carolina, which at the time had 12 seats in the U. S. House of Representatives and a 20% black voting age population. 509 U. S., at 633–634. Though North Carolina believed §2 required a second majority-minority district, the Court found North Carolina’s approach an impermissible racial gerrymander because the State had “concentrated a dispersed minority population in a single district by disregarding traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions.” Id., at 647.  The Court’s decisions in Bush and Shaw similarly declined to require additional majority-minority districts under §2 where those districts did not satisfy traditional districting principles.

 The Court recognizes that reapportionment remains primarily the duty and responsibility of the States, not the federal courts. Section 2 thus never requires adoption of districts that violate traditional redistricting principles and instead limits judicial intervention to “those instances of intensive racial politics” where the “excessive role [of race] in the electoral process . . . den[ies] minority voters equal opportunity to participate.” S. Rep. No. 97–417, pp. 33–34. Pp. 18–22.

 (c) To apply its race-neutral benchmark in practice, Alabama would require plaintiffs to make at least three showings. First, Alabama would require §2 plaintiffs to show that the illustrative maps adduced for the first Gingles precondition are not based on race. Alabama would next graft onto §2 a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate, at the totality of circumstances stage, that the State’s enacted plan contains fewer majority-minority districts than what an “average” race-neutral plan would contain. And finally, Alabama would have plaintiffs prove that any deviation between the State’s plan and a race-neutral plan is explainable “only” by race. The Court declines to adopt any of these novel requirements.

 Here, Alabama contends that because HB1 sufficiently “resembles” the “race-neutral” maps created by the State’s experts—all of which lack two majority-black districts—HB1 does not violate §2. Alabama’s reliance on the maps created by its experts Dr. Duchin and Dr. Imai is misplaced because those maps do not accurately represent the districting process in Alabama. Regardless, the map-comparison test that Alabama proposes is flawed in its fundamentals. Neither the text of §2 nor the fraught debate that produced it suggests that “equal access” to the fundamental right of voting turns on technically complicated computer simulations. Further, while Alabama has repeatedly emphasized that HB1 cannot have violated §2 because none of plaintiffs’ two million odd maps contained more than one majority-minority district, that (albeit very big) number is close to irrelevant in practice, where experts estimate the possible number of Alabama districting maps numbers is at least in the trillion trillions.

 Alabama would also require plaintiffs to demonstrate that any deviations between the State’s enacted plan and race-neutral alternatives “can be explained only by racial discrimination.” Brief for Alabama 44 (emphasis added). But the Court’s precedents and the legislative compromise struck in the 1982 amendments clearly rejected treating discriminatory intent as a requirement for liability under §2. Pp. 22, 25–30.

 (d) The Court disagrees with Alabama’s assertions that the Court should stop applying §2 in cases like these because the text of §2 does not apply to single-member redistricting and because §2 is unconstitutional as the District Court applied it here. Alabama’s understanding of §2 would require abandoning four decades of the Court’s §2 precedents. The Court has unanimously held that §2 and the Gingles framework apply to claims challenging single-member districts. Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40. As Congress is undoubtedly aware of the Court’s construction of §2 to apply to districting challenges, statutory stare decisis counsels staying the course until and unless Congress acts. In any event, the statutory text supports the conclusion that §2 applies to single-member districts. Indeed, the contentious debates in Congress about proportionality would have made little sense if §2’s coverage was as limited as Alabama contends.

 The Court similarly rejects Alabama’s argument that §2 as applied to redistricting is unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Court held over 40 years ago “that, even if §1 of the [Fifteenth] Amendment prohibits only purposeful discrimination,” City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 173, the VRA’s “ban on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment,” id., at 177. Alabama’s contention that the Fifteenth Amendment does not authorize race-based redistricting as a remedy for §2 violations similarly fails. The Court is not persuaded by Alabama’s arguments that §2 as interpreted in Gingles exceeds the remedial authority of Congress.

 The Court’s opinion does not diminish or disregard the concern that §2 may impermissibly elevate race in the allocation of political power within the States. Instead, the Court simply holds that a faithful application of precedent and a fair reading of the record do not bear those concerns out here. Pp. 30–34.

Nos. 21–1086, 582 F. Supp. 3d 924, and 21–1087, affirmed.

 Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B–1. Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Kavanaugh, J., joined except for Part III–B–1. Kavanaugh, J., filed an opinion concurring in all but Part III–B–1. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined, in which Barrett, J., joined as to Parts II and III, and in which Alito, J., joined as to Parts II–A and II–B. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Gorsuch, J., joined.

Notes
¹ Together with No. 21–1087, Allen, Alabama Secretary of State, et al. v. Caster et al., on certiorari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

Petitioner David Dubin was convicted of healthcare fraud under 18 U. S. C. §1347 after he overbilled Medicaid for psychological testing performed by the company he helped manage. The question is whether, in defrauding Medicaid, he also committed “[a]ggravated identity theft” under §1028A(a)(1). Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant, “during and in relation to any [predicate offense, such as healthcare fraud], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” The Government argued below that §1028A(a)(1) was automatically satisfied because Dubin’s fraudulent Medicaid billing included the patient’s Medicaid reimbursement number—a “means of identification.” Bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, the District Court allowed Dubin’s conviction for aggravated identity theft to stand, even though, in the District Court’s view, the crux of the case was fraudulent billing, not identity theft. The Fifth Circuit sitting en banc affirmed in a fractured decision, with five concurring judges acknowledging that under the Government’s reading of §1028A(a)(1), “the elements of [the] offense are not captured or even fairly described by the words ‘identity theft.’ ” 27 F. 4th 1021, 1024 (opinion of Richman, C. J.).

Held: Under §1028A(a)(1), a defendant “uses” another person’s means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense when the use is at the crux of what makes the conduct criminal. Pp. 4–21.

 (a) This case turns on the scope of two of §1028A(a)(1)’s elements: Dubin was convicted under §1028A(a)(1) for “us[ing]” a patient’s means of identification “in relation to” healthcare fraud. On the Government’s view, a defendant “uses” a means of identification “in relation to” a predicate offense if the defendant employs that means of identification to facilitate or further the predicate offense in some way. Section 1028A(a)(1) would thus apply automatically any time a name or other means of identification happens to be part of the payment or billing method used in the commission of a long list of predicate offenses. Dubin’s more targeted reading requires that the use of a means of identification have “a genuine nexus” to the predicate offense. When the underlying crime involves fraud or deceit, as many of §1028A’s predicates do, this entails using a means of identification specifically in a fraudulent or deceitful manner, not as a mere ancillary feature of a payment or billing method. A careful examination of §1028A(a)(1)’s text and structure points to a narrower reading. Pp. 4–5.

 (b) The terms “uses” and “in relation to” have been singled out by this Court as being particularly sensitive to context. The “various definitions of ‘use’ imply action and implementation.” Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137, 145. Beyond that general concept, however, “ ‘use’ takes on different meanings depending on context.” Id., at 143. This requires looking “not only to the word itself, but also to the statute and the [surrounding] scheme, to determine the meaning Congress intended.” Ibid. “In relation to” is similarly context sensitive. If extended to its furthest reach, “relate to” would be practically limitless. The phrase clearly refers to a relationship or nexus of some kind, but the nature and strength of this relationship or nexus will be informed by context. Because the presence of two such context-dependent terms renders §1028A(a)(1) doubly attuned to its surroundings, resort to context is especially necessary. Pp. 5–7.

 (c) Section 1028A(a)(1)’s title and terms both point toward reading the provision to capture the ordinary understanding of identity theft, where misuse of a means of identification is at the crux of the criminality. Pp. 8–15.

  (1) Section 1028A is a focused, standalone provision, and its title—“Aggravated identity theft”—suggests that identity theft is at the core of §1028A(a)(1). A statute’s title has long been considered a “ ‘too[l] available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 234. Section 1028A’s title is especially valuable here because it does not summarize a list of “complicated and prolific” provisions, Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528, and also “reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest,” Yates v. United States, 574 U. S. 528, 552 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). The Court has previously observed the contrast between §1028A’s targeted title and the broad title of neighboring provision §1028: “ ‘Fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents, authentication features, and information.’ ” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U. S. 646, 655. That “Congress separated the [identity] fraud crime from the [identity] theft crime in” §1028A suggests that §1028A is focused on identity theft specifically, rather than all fraud involving means of identification. Ibid.

 The Government urges the Court to ignore §1028A’s title, because the Government’s reading of the provision bears little resemblance to ordinary understandings of “identity theft.” This broad reading would, in practice, place garden-variety overbilling at the core of §1028A. Instead, “identity theft” has a focused meaning: “[T]he fraudulent appropriation and use of another person’s identifying data or documents,” Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary xi, or “[t]he unlawful taking and use of another person’s identifying information for fraudulent purposes,” Black’s Law Dictionary 894. This understanding of identity theft supports a reading of “in relation to” where use of the means of identification is at the crux of the underlying crime. And under these definitions, identity theft occurs when a defendant “uses” the means of identification itself to defraud others. Further, the inclusion of “aggravated” in §1028A’s title suggests that Congress had in mind a particularly serious form of identity theft, not just all manner of everyday overbilling offenses. Pp. 8–12.

  (2) Section 1028A(a)(1)’s language points in the same direction as its title. In particular, Congress used a trio of verbs that reflect an ordinary understanding of identity theft. Section 1028A(a)(1) applies when a defendant “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person,” “during and in relation to” any predicate offense. (Emphasis added). The two verbs neighboring “uses”—“transfers” and “possesses”—are most naturally read in the context of §1028A(a)(1) to connote not only theft, but ordinary understandings of identity theft in particular, i.e., they point to (1) theft of a (2) means of identification belonging to (3) another person. Because “transfer” and “possess” channel ordinary identity theft, the interpretative cannon noscitur a sociis (“ ‘a word is known by the company it keeps,’ ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U. S. 550, 568–569) indicates that “uses” should be read in a similar manner. In addition, the Court “assume[s] that Congress used [three] terms because it intended each term to a have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.” Bailey, 516 U. S., at 146. On a more targeted reading, §1028A(a)(1)’s three verbs capture the complexity of identity theft, which intermingles aspects of theft and fraud, misappropriation and deceitful use. While “transfer” and “possess” conjure up two steps of theft, “uses” supplies the deceitful use aspect. In contrast, if §1028A(a)(1) is not read in this narrow manner, then the two other verbs risk leaving “uses” without “virtually any function.” Ibid. Pp. 12–15.

 (d) The list of §1028A(a)(1)’s predicate offenses creates additional problems for the Government’s broad reading. Section 1028A(a)(1)’s enhancement adds a severe 2-year mandatory prison sentence onto underlying offenses that do not impose any mandatory prison sentence at all. The Government’s reading, however, does not meaningfully distinguish between the aggravated identity theft crime that Congress singled out for heightened punishment and other crimes. Instead, so long as the criteria for the broad predicate offenses are met, a defendant faces an automatic 2-year sentence for generic overbilling that happens to use names or other means of identification for routine billing and payment. A far more sensible conclusion from the statutory structure is that §1028A(a)(1)’s enhancement targets situations where the means of identification itself is at the crux of the underlying criminality, not just an ancillary billing feature. Pp. 15–17.

 (e) In contrast to the staggering breadth of the Government’s reading of §1028A, this Court has “ ‘traditionally exercised restraint in assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute,’ ” Marinello v. United States, 584 U. S. ___, ___, and prudently avoided reading incongruous breadth into opaque language in criminal statutes. See, e.g., Van Buren v. United States, 593 U. S. ___. The vast sweep of the Government’s reading—under which everyday overbilling cases would account for the majority of violations—“underscores the implausibility of the Government’s interpretation.” Id., at ___. While the Government represents that prosecutors will act responsibly in charging defendants under its sweeping reading, this Court “cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will ‘use it responsibly.’ ” McDonnell, 579 U. S., at 576. Pp. 17–19.

27 F. 4th 1021, vacated and remanded.

 Sotomayor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.

After Gorgi Talevski’s move to a nursing home in 2016 proved problematic, Talevski (through his wife Ivanka) brought an action under 42 U. S. C. §1983 against a county-owned nursing home and its agents (collectively, HHC), claiming that HHC’s treatment of Talevski violated rights guaranteed him under the Federal Nursing Home Reform Act (FNHRA). The District Court granted HHC’s subsequent motion to dismiss Talevski’s complaint, reasoning that no plaintiff can enforce provisions of the FNHRA via §1983. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the rights referred to in two FNHRA provisions invoked by Talevski—the right to be free from unnecessary chemical restraints, see §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii), and rights to be discharged or transferred only when certain preconditions are met, see §1396r(c)— “unambiguously confer individually enforceable rights on nursing-home residents,” making those rights presumptively enforceable via §1983. 6 F. 4th 713, 720. The Seventh Circuit further found nothing in the FNHRA to indicate congressional intent to foreclose §1983 enforcement.

Held: The FNHRA provisions at issue unambiguously create §1983-enforceable rights, and the Court discerns no incompatibility between private enforcement under §1983 and the remedial scheme that Congress devised. Pp. 5–23.

  (a) Section 1983 has, since the 1870s, provided an express cause of action to any person deprived (by someone acting under color of state law) of “any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws.” The Court has long refused to read §1983’s unmodified term “laws” to mean only some of the laws. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U. S. 1, 6. Looking to history, HHC attempts to sow doubt about §1983’s textually unqualified sweep, and proffers a Spending Clause-based argument to narrow §1983’s meaning. But a fuller picture of the relevant history lends HHC no aid.

  The Court is unpersuaded by HHC’s argument that, because Congress seems to have enacted the FNHRA pursuant to the Spending Clause, Talevski cannot invoke §1983 to vindicate rights recognized by the FNHRA. HHC starts with the Court’s observation that federal legislation premised on the Spending Clause power is “much in the nature of a contract,” Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17. From there, HHC argues that Spending Clause statutes may not be enforced via §1983 because contracts were not generally enforceable by third-party beneficiaries at when §1983 was enacted in the 1870s. The Court rejects HHC’s argument. First, while the Court has reasoned that Congress’s failure to displace firmly rooted common-law principles generally indicates that it incorporated those established principles into §1983, Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U. S. 158, 163–164, HHC’s key common-law plank here—that third-party beneficiaries could not sue to enforce contractual obligations during the relevant time—is, at a minimum, contestable. “[S]omething more than ‘ambiguous historical evidence’ is required [to] ‘flatly overrule a number of major decisions of this Court,’ ” Gamble v. United States, 587 U. S. ___, ___. Second, because “[t]here is no doubt that the cause of action created by §1983 is, and was always regarded as, a tort claim,” Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U. S. 687, 727 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment), HHC’s focus on 1870s law governing third-party-beneficiary suits in contract is perplexing, and HHC offers no reason those principles should be read to displace the plain scope of “laws” in §1983. Pp. 5–10.

  (b) Under the Court’s precedent, the FNHRA provisions at issue here unambiguously confer individual federal rights enforceable under §1983, and the Court discerns no intent by Congress in FNHRA to preclude private enforcement of these rights under §1983. Pp. 11–23.

   (1) Although federal statutes have the potential to create §1983-enforceable rights, they do so under this Court’s precedents only when the statute unambiguously confers those rights. The Court has recognized that the typical remedy for noncompliance with a federal statute enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather termination of funds to the State. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U. S. 273, 280. The parties here thus dispute whether this is the atypical case; that is, whether the unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions of the FNHRA “unambiguously confe[r]” individual rights, making those rights “presumptively enforceable” under §1983. Id., at 283–284.

  Gonzaga sets forth the Court’s established method for ascertaining unambiguous conferral. Courts must employ traditional tools of statutory construction to assess whether Congress has “unambiguously conferred” “individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries” to which the plaintiff belongs. Id., at 283, 285–286. Notably, it must be determined that “Congress intended to create a federal right” for the identified class, not merely that the plaintiffs fall “within the general zone of interest that the statute is intended to protect.” Id., at 283 (emphasis deleted). The test for unambiguous conferral is satisfied where the provision in question is “ ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited’ ” and contains “rights-creating,” individual-centric language with an “ ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’ ” Id., at 284, 287 (emphasis deleted). If a statutory provision surmounts this significant hurdle, it “secures” individual rights that are deemed “presumptively enforceable” under §1983. Id., at 284.

  The unnecessary-restraint and predischarge-notice provisions in FNHRA that Talevski’s complaint invokes meet this test. The FNHRA lays out a litany of statutory “[r]equirements relating to residents’ rights,” §1396r(c). The unnecessary-restraint provision requires nursing facilities to “protect and promote” residents’ “right to be free from . . . any physical or chemical restraints . . . not required to treat the resident’s medical symptoms.” §1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii). The predischarge-notice provision imposes preconditions that a nursing facility must meet to “transfer or discharge [a] resident.” §§1396r(c)(2)(A)–(B). Both provisions reside in §1396r(c), which expressly concerns “[r]equirements relating to residents’ rights.” Ibid. (emphasis added). This framing is indicative of an individual “rights-creating” focus. Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284. That these two provisions also establish who must comply with these statutory rights (namely, the Medicaid-participant nursing homes) does not dispel the statute’s focus on the nursing-home residents, i.e., the benefited class. The provisions use clear “rights-creating language,” speak “ ‘in terms of the persons benefited,’ ” and have an “ ‘unmistakable focus on the benefited class.’ ” Id., at 284, 287, 290 (emphasis deleted). Thus, they satisfy Gonzaga’s stringent standard, and the rights they recognize are presumptively enforceable under §1983. Pp. 11–17.

   (2) Even if a statutory provision unambiguously secures rights, a defendant “may defeat [the] presumption by demonstrating that Congress did not intend” that §1983 be available to enforce those rights. Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U. S. 113, 120. Evidence of such intent may be found expressly in the statute creating the right, or im plicitly, by creating “a ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983,” ibid. Here, the Court finds evidence of neither. The FNHRA establishes a detailed administrative scheme for inspections of nursing facilities, see §1396r(g), and authorizes governments to sanction and correct noncompliant facilities, see §1396r(h). But the statute lacks any indicia of congressional intent to preclude §1983 enforcement, such as an express private judicial right of action or any other provision that might signify that intent. HHC focuses on comprehensiveness of FNHRA’s enforcement mechanisms, but implicit preclusion is shown only by a “ ‘comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under §1983.’ ” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable School Comm., 555 U. S. 246, 252 (emphasis added). The Court’s prior cases finding implicit preclusion involved statutes where private enforcement under §1983 would have thwarted Congress’s scheme by circumventing the statutes’ presuit procedures, or by giving plaintiffs access to tangible benefits otherwise unavailable under the statutes construed. HHC has identified no equivalent sign of incompatibility in the FNHRA, which lacks a private judicial right of action, a private federal administrative remedy, or any “carefu[l]” congressional “tailor[ing],” Fitzgerald, 555 U. S., at 255, that §1983 actions would “distort,” Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U. S., at 127. Finally, the Court rejects any speculation that because Congress knew most nursing homes are private entities not subject to suit under §1983, the FNHRA’s remedial scheme “necessarily reflects Congress’s judgment that these administrative enforcement mechanisms appropriately protect the rights the statute confers,” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 31. The focus in the implicit-preclusion inquiry remains whether something in the FNHRA has foreclosed §1983’s “genera[l]” availability as “a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes.” Gonzaga, 536 U. S., at 284. The Court sees no such sign, much less a license for the Court to construct and impute to Congress an intent that the FNHRA does not embody. Pp. 17–23.

6 F. 4th 713, affirmed.

 Jackson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett, JJ., joined. Gorsuch, J., filed a concurring opinion. Barrett, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined.