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FIRST FLOOR LIVING LLC (22-3216); LUSH DESIGNS,
LLC (22-3217),
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CLEVELAND, OHIO; LASTER LLC; BAUMANN
ENTERPRISES, INC.; CUYAHOGA COUNTY LAND
REUTILIZATION CORPORATION,
Defendants-Appellees. |
Nos. 22-3216/3217 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:21-cv-00018—J. Philip Calabrese, District Judge.
Argued: December 6, 2022
Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023
Before: SILER, GILMAN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
SILER, Circuit Judge. In 2018, First Floor Living, LLC (“First Floor”) and Lush
Designs, LLC (“Lush Designs”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) each purchased real estate parcels in
Cleveland for the purpose of rehabilitating and redeveloping the properties. First Floor’s
property was located at 4400 Warner Road, and Lush Designs’ property was located at 7410
Linwood Avenue. Prior to Plaintiffs’ purchases, the City of Cleveland (“Cleveland”) declared
the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be
demolished. Following the purchases, and after Plaintiffs had invested time and resources into
renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them.
In 2021, following demolition of the buildings, Plaintiffs filed suit against Cleveland;
Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (“Land Bank”); Laster, LLC (Laster); and
Baumann Enterprises, Inc. (“Baumann”) (collectively “Defendants”), arguing that the
demolitions violated numerous state laws and federal constitutional provisions.1 The district
court denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion for discovery, granted summary judgment to
Defendants on the constitutional claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the remaining state law claims.
Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by denying their Rule 56(d) motion for
discovery and by granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We affirm. |
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TEAMSTERS LOCAL 237 WELFARE FUND, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SERVICEMASTER GLOBAL HOLDINGS, INC.; NIKHIL M.
VARTY; ANTHONY D. DILUCENTE,
Defendants-Appellees. |
No. 22-5981 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee at Memphis.
No. 2:20-cv-02553—S. Thomas Anderson, District Judge.
Argued: July 20, 2023
Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023
Before: GILMAN, LARSEN, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Pest-control company Terminix faced a “super
termite” crisis from 2018 to 2019 that predominately affected homeowners in the Mobile,
Alabama area. Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund (the Fund) alleges that Terminix’s parent
company, ServiceMaster Global Holdings, Inc. (ServiceMaster), its then-CEO Nikhil Varty, and
its then-CFO Anthony DiLucente (collectively, the Defendants), violated the federal securities
laws through a series of misrepresentations and omissions that understated ServiceMaster’s
liability for the resulting termite-damage claims, concealed the risk of such claims from
investors, and falsely touted the company’s customer-retention and growth efforts while
strategically using price increases to cause affected customers to drop their service contracts in
an attempt to limit its future liability. The Fund also claims that these actions and omissions
constituted a scheme to defraud ServiceMaster’s investors by inflating the company’s reported
financial results relative to its true financial condition. All of this allegedly caused a financial
loss to the Fund as an investor in ServiceMaster’s stock.
In response, the Defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit for failure to state a claim. The
district court concluded that, although the Fund had alleged two potentially actionable
misstatements and omissions, it had failed to plead a strong inference that the Defendants had
acted with the scienter required by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), 109 Stat. 737, Pub. L. No. 104-67. Accordingly, the court dismissed the case. For the
reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. |
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L. C.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee. |
No. 22-6105 |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington.
No. 5:21-cv-00124—Gregory F. Van Tatenhove, District Judge.
Argued: July 26, 2023
Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023
Before: MOORE, GIBBONS, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While L. C. was incarcerated at Federal
Medical Center, Lexington (“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky, she was repeatedly sexually
assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee Hosea Lee. L. C. alleges that the BOP knew
or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women. She claims that
the BOP failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because
BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. Accordingly, L. C. filed a
negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).
Because a BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to
report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official, and because
deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations, this type of negligence
claim falls outside the scope of the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. But because
L. C.’s specific allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted, we
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. |
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L. W., by and through her parents and next friends,
Samantha Williams and Brian Williams; SAMANTHA
WILLIAMS; BRIAN WILLIAMS; JOHN DOE, by and
through his parents and next friends, Jane Doe and
James Doe; JANE DOE; JAMES DOE; RYAN ROE, by and
through his parent and next friend, Rebecca Roe;
REBECCA ROE; SUSAN N. LACY, on behalf of herself
and her patients,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
JONATHAN THOMAS SKRMETTI, in his official capacity
as the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter, et
al.,
Defendants-Appellants,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Intervenor-Appellee.
___________________________________________
JANE DOE 1, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
WILLIAM C. THORNBURY, JR., M.D., in his official
capacity as the President of the Kentucky Board of
Medical Licensure, et al.,
Defendants,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY ex rel. DANIEL
CAMERON, Attorney General of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky,
Intervenor-Appellant. |
No. 23-5600
No. 23-5609 |
No. 23-5600 On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:23-cv-00376—Eli J. Richardson, District Judge.
No. 23-5609 On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Kentucky at Louisville.
No. 3:23-cv-00230—David J. Hale, District Judge.
Argued: September 1, 2023
Decided and Filed: September 28, 2023
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; WHITE and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
_________________________
OPINION
_________________________
SUTTON, Chief Judge. At issue in these two cases is whether the United States
Constitution prohibits Kentucky and Tennessee from limiting certain sex-transition treatments
for minors experiencing gender dysphoria.
. . .
No one in these consolidated cases debates the existence of gender dysphoria or the
distress caused by it. And no one doubts the value of providing psychological and related care to
children facing it. The question is whether certain additional treatments—puberty blockers,
hormone treatments, and surgeries—should be added to the mix of treatments available to those
age 17 and under. As to that, we return to where we started. This is a relatively new diagnosis
with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it
is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age
limits of any sort for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing a difficult-to-amend Constitution should be humble and careful about
announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected
officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.
For these reasons, we reverse the preliminary injunctions issued in these cases and
remand them for further proceedings consistent with this decision. |
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