RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Great Lakes Exploration Group, LLC (GLEG), a private underwater exploration and salvage company, brought an in rem admiralty action seeking an arrest warrant for an ancient sailing vessel (The Griffin) that sank in Lake Michigan in the 1600s. The state of Michigan intervened to claim title to the vessel pursuant to the Abandoned Shipwreck Act (ASA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2106. Under the ASA, when a state does not have actual possession of a shipwreck, the state may establish title if it can show that the vessel is both (1) abandoned, and (2) embedded in the state’s submerged lands. Once a state acquires actual possession of a shipwreck, however, the Eleventh Amendment applies and the federal courts lack jurisdiction over the claim.

In the present case, the district court ordered GLEG to disclose the precise location of the vessel so that Michigan could investigate whether the shipwreck was “embedded” within the meaning of the ASA. The court also decided that it would not arrest the vessel until its precise location was disclosed to the state. GLEG refused, arguing that without additional protections to safeguard federal jurisdiction, such as arrest of the shipwreck, the state would be free to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity and divest the district court of jurisdiction. The district court then dismissed GLEG’s complaint without prejudice for failure to comply with the court’s order.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that a district court may require a salvor to reveal the precise location of a shipwreck at the pleading stage where (1) there is a need for the precise location because, for example, the embedded status of the shipwreck under the ASA is in dispute, (2) the requested information is available and in the salvor’s possession, and (3) the district court has taken sufficient steps to secure federal jurisdiction over the claim and, when warranted, to protect the information from public disclosure. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court dismissing GLEG’s claim and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. In this long-standing property-use dispute, the district court on its own motion vacated a summary judgment that it had previously granted against plaintiffs-counterdefendants Donald and Donna Dunn, who in the district court’s view had up to then not been adequately represented. The court also vacated its previous decision to place the Dunns’ property in receivership. Counter-plaintiffs Michael and Nancy Savage and the court-appointed receiver appeal both of these decisions. Although an order vacating summary judgment is not a final appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Savages contend that this court should hear their appeal pursuant to the common law exception to the final order rule that allows for appellate jurisdiction when the district court has acted without authority. The district court, however, had authority to vacate the summary judgment on its own motion because, as it turned out, the summary judgment order had never been entered. Therefore, this court has no jurisdiction to review the district court’s non-final decision to vacate the summary judgment. This court also lacks jurisdiction to review the interlocutory order vacating the receivership. The provision of 28 U.S.C. §1292 allowing for appeals from interlocutory orders that modify an injunction does not apply to that order. We therefore dismiss this appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.