CLICK HERE FOR FULL TEXT

TRAFALGAR CORPORATION; BRUCE GEISINGER; and MARK GEISINGER,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MIAMI COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and CONCORD TOWNSHIP, MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO,
Defendants-Appellees.


No. 06-3578

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio at Dayton.
No. 05-00084—Michael R. Merz, Magistrate Judge.
Argued: September 10, 2007
Decided and Filed: March 3, 2008
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; MARTIN and SUTTON, Circuit Judges.

_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Trafalgar Corporation sought a federal court determination of its constitutional takings and equal protection claims against the Miami County Board of Commissioners and Concord Township. The district court dismissed the case on a motion for summary judgment finding that Trafalgar’s claims were barred by principles of preclusion. For the following reasons we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.


CLICK HERE FOR FULL TEXT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WALTER RALPH MABRY (06-2324); ANTHONY MICHAEL (06-2327),
Defendants-Appellants.


Nos. 06-2324/2327

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 04-80977—Bernard A. Friedman, Chief District Judge.
Argued: October 24, 2007
Decided and Filed: March 3, 2008
Before: KEITH and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; ALDRICH, District Judge.

_________________________
OPINION
_________________________

ANN ALDRICH, District Judge. Defendants-Appellants Walter Ralph Mabry and Anthony Michael were convicted and sentenced for conspiring to solicit and obtain prohibited payments from union contractors, and for soliciting and obtaining such payments, in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 186. On appeal, Mabry and Michael argue that (1) the district court erred in ruling that the term “settlement” under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(2) is limited to settlements in the context of formal litigation or arbitration; (2) they are entitled to a judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support a finding that the exception to liability under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(3) should not apply; and (3) the district court engaged in unsupported judicial fact finding to arrive at Mabry’s sentence. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court on all counts, but recognize the possibility of a broader interpretation of “settlement” than that of the district court.