McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying her second motion to reopen removal proceedings. The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over the petition for review because, subsequent to its filing with this court, the BIA granted Petitioner’s motion to reconsider and released a new opinion addressing the arguments raised in Petitioner’s second motion to reopen. Petitioner has not sought review of the BIA’s new decision nor has she replied to the government’s jurisdictional argument. For the reasons stated below, we agree with the government and DISMISS the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Stephen Dearth and the Second Amendment Foundation appeal the venue-based dismissal-without-prejudice of their action. The plaintiffs had brought suit in federal court in Ohio to enjoin the enforcement of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922 that prohibit non-residents of the United States from receiving or selling firearms for non-sporting purposes. Because the plaintiffs requested the dismissal-without-prejudice as an alternative to transfer, however, the district court’s order is an unappealable voluntary dismissal. We therefore dismiss the appeal.

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. The Michigan Public Services Commission ordered Quick Communications Incorporated and Michigan Bell Telephone Company (d/b/a AT&T) to amend their interconnection agreement to conform with the Commission’s most recently approved service rates. Quick brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the terms of the interconnection agreement, the Sierra-Mobile doctrine, and the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution prohibited the Commission’s action. The district court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all of Quick’s claims. Quick now appeals.

The MPSC had the authority to implement new TELRIC rates. Requiring Quick and AT&T to amend their interconnection agreement to conform to those new rates was within the Commission’s authority and was not a violation of the Federal Telecommunications Act, the Sierra- Mobile doctrine, or the Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of AT&T.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Mr. Ernest B. Eady appeals the judgment of the district court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Eady was convicted of second degree murder in Tennessee state court. He argues that he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and because his counsel had provided ineffective assistance on direct appeal. Both his claims are based on the fact that, subsequent to his conviction, Tennessee law regarding the scienter required for second degree murder was clarified. Prior to his conviction, Tennessee state law allowed a person to be convicted for second degree murder if that person was aware of the nature of his conduct or if that person was aware that his conduct was reasonably certain to cause death. Mr. Eady’s jury was instructed consistent with this definition. It is now clear that, to be convicted of second degree murder under Tennessee law, a person must be aware that the nature of his conduct is reasonably certain to result in death. Mr. Eady asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove this scienter, and that, on direct appeal, his appellate counsel should have argued for a new trial on the basis that his trial jury had been improperly instructed. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals ruled against Mr. Eady on both issues on state post-conviction review. The district court similarly found Mr. Eady’s arguments unpersuasive, and accordingly denied Mr. Eady’s petition. Upon review, we conclude that the district court was correct, and we accordingly affirm the district court’s judgment and deny Mr. Eady’s petition.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In this case we are asked to decide as a matter of first impression whether pretrial detention with respect to an indictment that later yields a conviction tolls the running of a period of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624. This is a difficult and close case, but today we part ways with the Ninth Circuit and hold that when a defendant is held for thirty days or longer in pretrial detention, and he is later convicted for the offense for which he was held, and his pretrial detention is credited as time served toward his sentence, then the pretrial detention is “in connection with” a conviction and tolls the period of supervised release under § 3624.