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729, INC., FOXX RESTAURANTS, INC., THE VENUS LOUNGE, INC., PATSY HIATT, TINA STURGEON, WANDA BLANKENSHIP,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
FOSTER, INC.,
Plaintiff,
KIM FORAN, LIBERTY’S SHOW LOUNGE, INC.,
Intervening Plaintiffs,
v.
KENTON COUNTY FISCAL COURT,
Defendant-Appellee.


No. 06-6390

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington.
No. 04-00212—David L. Bunning, District Judge.
Argued: July 17, 2007
Decided and Filed: February 6, 2008
Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and CLAY and ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

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OPINION
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BOGGS, Chief Judge. This case stems from Kenton County’s enactment of a licensing ordinance that comprehensively regulates sexually oriented businesses within the County’s jurisdiction. A group of such businesses and their employees brought suit against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and K.R.S. § 418.040, challenging the constitutionality of the Ordinance. Before the district court, the plaintiffs raised more than ten separate constitutional claims. Both sides moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted to the County.

The plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal. First, they claim that the Ordinance violates the First Amendment by barring entertainers from entering areas of an establishment occupied by customers within one hour of the entertainers’ performing semi-nude on stage. Second, they claim that the Ordinance violates their rights under the Contracts Clause of Article I, § 10 of the Constitution. Third, they claim that the Ordinance’s judicial review provisions do not satisfy the First Amendment’s prompt-judicial-review requirements. Fourth, they claim that the Ordinance’s license fees are excessive, content-based taxes that violate the First Amendment. Following a brief recitation of the background of this case, we address each of the plaintiffs’ challenges in turn, relating details relevant to each respective challenge when appropriate. Ultimately, we affirm the district court with respect to the first three challenges and we vacate and remand for further proceedings with respect to the fourth challenge.