R. GUY COLE, JR., Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Charles D. Mickey appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment on his claims brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq., and Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101 et seq. Mickey’s lawsuit advances two claims: (1) that Zeidler Tool & Die Company (“Zeidler”), his employer, and Harold DeForge, the sole owner of Zeidler, discriminated against him on the basis of age in reducing his salary and benefits, and in terminating him; and (2) that Zeidler terminated him in retaliation for filing a charge of age discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). The district court held that Mickey failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, finding that Mickey had not shown that he was replaced by a significantly younger person. Although Zeidler terminated Mickey immediately upon receiving notice of his EEOC complaint, the district court also concluded that Mickey failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he was unable to show a causal connection between his protected activity and his termination. Finally, the district court found that, even if Mickey had established a prima facie claim of retaliation, Zeidler offered legitimate, non-discriminatory business reasons for terminating Mickey and that Mickey failed to demonstrate that those reasons were a pretext for discrimination.

For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Zeidler on Mickey’s age discrimination claims; REVERSE the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Zeidler on Mickey’s retaliation claims; and REMAND the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. This matter is before us on the NLRB’s petition to enforce its order holding that the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 429 (“IBEW” or “Union”), and an apprenticeship committee, retaliated against an apprentice for being delinquent in paying his union dues and for expressing anti-union views. The Union and apprenticeship committee crossappealed, seeking review of the NLRB’s order. For the reasons stated below, we remand to the NLRB for further consideration and articulation of its conclusion that the apprenticeship committee acted as an agent of the Union.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Gamil Al-Najar appeals from a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) opinion that Al-Najar failed to meet his burden of proof for establishing eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, and holding that Al-Najar was eligible for removal due to a 2002 Michigan state conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Al-Najar argues that he is not subject to removal because his prior conviction did not in fact involve a controlled substance and because his plea of guilty was withdrawn and his conviction vacated. Al- Najar argues further that the IJ abused its discretion in declining to continue Al-Najar’s case, the IJ breached a duty to inform Al-Najar that he was eligible for relief under Immigration Nationality Act § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182, he was entitled to voluntary departure, and he had demonstrated that he was qualified for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

The government urges us to remand to the BIA so that the agency may determine whether Al-Najar’s conviction for possession of khat constitutes possession of a controlled substance. In the alternative, the government argues that Al-Najar may not collaterally attack his state conviction; the BIA found correctly that petitioner’s conviction applied for immigration purposes; this court lacks jurisdiction to consider Al-Najar’s requests for continuance and voluntary departure; the IJ did not err in failing to provide petitioner the opportunity to apply for a § 212(h) waiver; and Al-Najar has waived review of the denial of his petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and withholding under the CAT. Al-Najar opposes a remand.

For the reasons stated below, we hold that a remand is unnecessary because Al-Najar’s challenge to his Michigan state court conviction constitutes an impermissible collateral attack. Because Al-Najar presents no other claims that would entitle him to relief, we deny the petition for review.

PER CURIAM. Jose Gregorio Vasquez Salazar, a native and citizen of Venezuela, petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) order that denied his motion for reconsideration of a previous order, issued October 2, 2006, dismissing his appeal as untimely. The Board’s October 2006 order affirmed an Immigration Judge’s decision that denied his application for asylum and withholding of deportation. The parties have waived oral argument and this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a).